Bar Association Bills by Quiat, Ira L.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 32 Issue 4 Article 5 
June 2021 
Bar Association Bills 
Ira L. Quiat 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ira L. Quiat, Bar Association Bills, 32 Dicta 211 (1955). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
May-June, 1955
BAR ASSOCIATION BILLS
By IRA L. QUIAT, of the Denver Bar *
The Legislative Committee of the Denver Bar Association
drafted and offered to the 40th General Assembly of the State of
Colorado twenty-three (23) Bills.
Twenty (20) of these measures were passed, signed by the
Governor, and are now in effect.
S.B. 35-COPIES OF BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE
Many business firms now Photograph or Micro-film business
records and destroy the original records. This Act makes such
substituted records admissible in evidence if the original would be
competent.
H.B. 329-APPEALS FROM JUSTICE COURTS AND
H.B. 331-APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS
The former statutes providing for appeals from Municipal
(Police) Courts from a conviction of a violation of an ordinance,
and for appeals from the Justice Courts from a conviction of a
criminal offense provided as a condition precedent that the de-
fendant give bond. In a recent case a defendant who had been con-
victed of a violation of an ordinance sought to appeal to the
Superior Court. Judge Johns held that the provision requiring
a bond before an appeal could be taken was unconstitutional be-
cause a defendant had a fundamental right to appeal. These new
acts now provide that a defendant may appeal from the Municipal
Court and from a Justice Court by merely giving notice of appeal.
If no bond is furnished, the judgment or sentence is not stayed,
and the defendant remains in jail. The defendant may at any time
after appeal, execute a bond, and the judgment will then be stayed.
The Municipal Court act further provides that upon the trial
after an appeal is taken the County Court or Superior Court, and
not the jury, fixes the sentence if the defendant is convicted by
the jury.
S.B. 72-STATUTORY FORMS OF DEEDS AND MORTGAGES
In 1917, the Legislature passed an act providing for short
statutory forms of deeds and mortgages which contained the long
form of acknowledgment then provided for by law.
In 1927, the simple form of acknowledgement now used was
adopted, but the Revisor of the Colorado statutes did not feel that
he had the authority to substitute the simple acknowledgment for
the long acknowledgment contained in the sections setting forth
the statutory deed and mortgage, and the 1953 computation still
provided the long form acknowledgment for the statutory instru-
ment. In this new act, the simple acknowledgment was substituted
for the old acknowledgment.
S.B. 201-CONCERNING WILLS
Our probate laws provided that if a witness to a will was de-
* Chairman, Legislative Committee, Denver Bar Association.
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ceased or removed to a distant country, or if his testimony could
not be procured, his signature could be established by proof of
the handwriting or other admissible evidence.
In the 1953 Revision of our Statutes, through an inadvertence
this provision was omitted. The Legislature adopted the 1953 Re-
vision as the official and existing laws of the State. This provision,
therefore, was inadvertently repealed.
To re-establish this method of proving the signature of a wit-
ness, the above Bill was passed.
H.B. 258-CORPORATIONS
Section 31-1-19, C.R.S. 1953, stated the essential powers which
each corporation possessed under the laws of this state, and law-
yers did not believe it was necessary to re-state the same in a cer-
tificate of incorporation. However, this section contained a pro-
vision at the end reading as follows: "provided such powers are
included within the objects set forth in its certificate of incorpora-
tion." Some lawyers were of the opinion that all of the powers
granted to a corporation under 31-1-19 had to be incorporated in
the certificate of incorporation because of this proviso. Other law-
yers felt that the proviso only applied to the last subsection of
this section.
In either case, the Legislative Committee felt that a corpora-
tion should have the right to exercise all of these powers whether
stated in the certificate of incorporation or not. The Committee,
therefore, rewrote the entire section, improved the language, and
broadened some of the powers. None of the powers set forth in
this new act need be set forth in the certificate of incorporation.
All corporations can exercise these general powers, even though
omitted from the certificate of incorporation.
Section 31-1-16 formerly provided that the certificate should
contain a statement whether the corporation was to have per-
petual existence, and if not, its duration.
Section 31-1-19 formerly provided that if no period of exist-
ence was stated the corporation was to have perpetual existence.
There was an apparent conflict. Under this new act, if the term
is not stated, the corporation's existence is perpetual.Subsection 13 of Section 31-1-6 provided that if a corporation
was created for the purpose of carrying on part or all of its busi-
ness outside of the State, that the certificate should so state. Most
certificates failed to contain such provision. Many Colorado cor-
porations transacted business in other states. The law now pro-
vides that if the corporation is organized to do all of its business
outside of the State, the certificate must state that fact. Domestic
corporations may now carry on a part of its business in any other
state even though the certificate of incorporation contains no state-
ment of such power.
S.B. 202-DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATIONS
Section 31-6-3, C.R.S. 1953, provided that a corporation could
not be dissolved until, all of its debts were fully paid, the notice
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of dissolution was filed with the Secretary of State, a copy thereof
in each County where the articles of incorporation had been filed,
and the notice of dissolution was published in a newspaper printed
in each of such counties. Until all of the foregoing requirements
were complied with, the corporation was not dissolved. Technically
thousands of corporations purported to have been dissolved are
still legally in existence for a failure to literally comply with all
conditions.
Now the notice of dissolution may state that all of the debts
of the corporation have been paid, or provided for. If a corpora-
tion executed a mortgage and thereafter sold the property, and
the purchaser assumed the mortgage, the payment of this indebt-
edness was provided for, and the corporation could be dissolved.
Upon the filing of a certificate of dissolution with the Secre-
tary of State the corporation is dissolved. Thereafter, the officers
of the company must (a) publish at least once the notice of dissolu-
tion only in the county where the principal office of the corporation
was located, and (b) file a certified copy of the notice of dissolu-
tion with the office of the Recorder in each county in the State
where the corporation owned an interest in real estate at the date
of its dissolution; but these latter requirements are directory and
a recovery not exceeding $1,000 for damages resulting from the
failure to file in any respected county is provided.
S.B. 292-RELATING To LIENS
A mechanic's lien properly filed is a charge against the prop-
erty for a period of six months after the last work or labor is per-
formed or furnished. If an action to foreclose such lien is not
brought within said six months' period the lien is of no force. In
examining abstracts, lawyers find liens of record for a period
longer than six months, and cannot pass the title safely without
an independent investigation to determine the lapse of time since
the completion of the work or the furnishing of the last labor or
materials.
This new Act adds a section to our lien law and requires the
lien claimant or someone in his behalf to file annually an affidavit
within 30 days from the annual anniversary of a filing of the lien
to the effect that the improvements have not been completed. It in
no way affects the requirement of the bringing of the suit within
six months or the filing of the lis pendens within the six months.
Hereafter, if the lien is more than one year old, and there is no
such affidavit filed, the lawyer can disregard the lien.
S.B.-294-CONCERNING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Prior to this new Act, a foreign corporation, if it had any
liability in this state, could not mortgage its real or personal prop-
erty unless it published a notice, for six (6) successive weeks, of
its intention to mortgage, and requiring persons who had claims
against such corporation, to file the same with a County Clerk in
the county in which the property was located. If the foregoing
requirements were not complied with, the mortgage was void.
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Most lawyers disregarded these provisions and approved titles
for loans to foreign corporations and titles based on mortgages to
foreign corporations without determining whether these provisions
had been complied with.
The new law eliminates these unreasonable technical pro-
visions and places foreign corporations on the same plane as domes-
tic corporations in so far as mortgages. There are some other
minor changes in this law which I do not detail.
The Secretary of State is now designated as the agent of a
corporation for the service of process if the corporation has not
appointed an agent in this state, or if the agent is absent from the
county for 30 days.
S.B. 32-CONCERNING JOINT TENANCY
Section 118-2-1, C.R.S. 1953, formerly provided that no joint
tenancy could be created unless the instrument of conveyance ex-
pressly declared the property was to pass "not in tenancy in com-
mon but in joint tenancy." If a deed conveyed to two persons
merely as joint tenants, no joint tenancy was created. This tech-
nicality is now removed. If the instrument sets forth that the
property is conveyed in joint tenancy, it is sufficient.
The old law detailed instances where a grantor could name
himself and others as grantees, but through inadvertence pro-
vided that tenants in common and joint tenants could convey to
'themselves, or to themselves and others. In other words, all of the
joint tenants, or all of the tenants in common had to be grantees,
and if it was the desire of a number of such owners to convey that
property to a lesser number of the grantors, it could not be done
by such instrument.
The new law uses the simple expression that a grantor can
also be one of the grantees.
S.B. 199-APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE TO MAKE MINERAL, OIL AND
GAS LEASES WHERE FUTURE INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED
The discovery of oil, gas, and uranium in vast quantities in
this state focused the attention of lawyers upon the legal compli-
cations in obtaining leases where "future interests" were involved.
The proceeds from oil and minerals are a part of the corpus and
not income from the land. A life tenant has no right to deprive
the owners of future interests from the oil and minerals in and
under the land. Many parcels of real estate could not be leased
because of the inability to obtain the signatures of the owners of
future interests to such lease. Oil and gas wells situate on a join-
ing land were draining the oil and gas from the land affected by
the future interests, and there was no remedy.L. A -J
ThisA empowers the Court in an appropriate action to
appoint a trustee to make such a lease, and provides for the appor-
tionment of the proceeds.
S.B. 293-FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section 58-1-10, C.R.S., 1953, provided that on the face of a
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complaint in a F.E.D. action a copy of Section 58-1-12 should ap-
pear. This was an error, it should have read Section 58-1-13 (the
requirement to answer).
The Legislative Committee corrected this mistake, re-wrote
this section, and made it clear and simple. Instead of requiring
the answer to be filed on or before the "return day," the answer
must now be filed on or before the "time specified for the appear-
ance of the defendant in the summons." In a Justice Court a plain-
tiff no longer has to wait until the next day to have a default, but
it can be entered against a non-appearing defendant within one
hour after the time specified in the summons for appearance as in
other justice cases. The pleadings need no longer be verified.
The old Section of the F.E.D. Act concerning "Notices to
Quit" to terminate a tenancy was ambiguous in many respects. It
has been re-drafted and a definite period for the service of the
notice to terminate tenancies of all kinds is now clearly provided.
The ambiguity as to whether a tenant had to serve such notice on
the landlord has been eliminated, and both the tenant and the land-
lord must now serve a notice to terminate a tenancy unless the
tenancy by the terms of the agreement ends at a time certain.
H.B. 261-'ASCERTAINMENT AND APPORTIONMENT OF PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME BETWEEN TENANTS AND REMAINDERMEN
Many states have adopted this uniform act which provides a
clear method of ascertaining income and principal and the appor-
tionment of receipts and expenses between tenants and remainder-
men when there is no provision, therefore, in the instrument creat-
ing such estates. The act is about six or seven pages in length and
space cannot here be taken to set forth the various provisions. All
lawyers should acquaint themselves with the provisions of this
new law.
H.B. 259-PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY TAX DEEDS
The City of Denver, in disposing of real estate it acquired
through treasurer's deeds, followed a practice which was not in
full compliance with Section 137-10-43, C.R.S. 1953, relying on
the provisions of the charter and the ordinances of the City. This
new law added a new subsection to the effect that the provisions
of Section 137-10-43 do not apply to cities and counties of a popu-
lation in excess of 300,000, and that such cities and counties may
make sales and leases of tax title lots in compliance with the char-
ter and the ordinances of such city and county. A six months'
limitation period is fixed in which to question prior sales made by
such city and county.
H.B. 260-ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This law reinacts our acknowledgment statute and adds two
additional subsections providing (a) that if the persons acknowl-
edging the instrument be the directors, trustees, or managers of
a dissolved or expired corporation, that the acknowledgment is
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prima facie evidence that such persons were such directors, trus-
tees, or managers and (b) if the person acknowledging be a part-
ner that the acknowledgment is prima facie evidence that such
person was a partner and had the proper authority from the part-
nership to execute and acknowledge the instrument as the act of
the partnership.
S.B. 200-RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL AND BENEVOLENT
CORPORATIONS
Lawyers examining titles found that religious, educational,
and benevolent societies (hereinafter collectively styled religious
corporations) having an interest in real estate were incorporated
under the non-profit statute. This was expressly prohibited under
the provisions of the statutes relating to religious corporations. A
serious question as to marketability was presented.
In 1951 the Legislative Committee recommended to the Legis-
lature a new non-profit statute which was passed and which pro-
vided that religious corporations could be incorporated under this
new non-profit statute. The 1953 revision of our statutes started
out by stating that the non-profit law did not apply to any religious
corporations. That rendered futile the action of the Legislature in
1951.
To eliminate this mistake on the part of the revisor of the
statutes and to modernize and to remove any antiquated provisions
of the law governing religious corporations, this new law was
passed. Religious corporations can now be incorporated either
under this new act or under the non-profit statute.
S.B. 203-AMENDING CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
The laws concerning the amending of certificates of incorpor-
ation provided that no corporation could, by amendment, change
the objects and purposes for which the corporation was originally
organized. This worked a hardship on many existing corporations
who wanted to expand into new lines and endeavors.
We re-wrote Section 31-3-1 giving a corporation unlimited
power to amend its certificate of incorporation.
The old law also attempted to provide for amendments of
certificates of incorporation of corporations not having any stock.
There are separate provisions of law dealing with amendments of
certificates of incorporation for non-profit, religious, and similar
corporations. We, therefore, eliminated these provisions in the old
act which created confused situations.
S.B. 291-RELATING To INSURANCE COMPANIES
Domestic insurance companies are required to deposit securi-
ties with the insurance commissioner. Foreign corporations doing
business in this state, as a general rule, make no such deposit with
the Colorado insurance commissioner. In a number of cases, judg-
ments have been obtained against foreign insurance companies in
DICTA
May-June, 1955
Colorado courts and the foreign insurance company refused to pay
the judgment, necessitating another suit in the state where the in-
surance company was domiciled.
Under this new act, if a judgment is obtained against a for-
eign insurance company and is not paid, and the sheriff's return
discloses that he cannot collect the judgment, the judgment creditor
or his attorney may file a complaint with the insurance commis-
sioner. After reasonable notice to the insurance company, the
commissioner may suspend the license of such company to do busi-
ness in this state, until the judgment is paid.
H.B. 385-RELATING To CHATTEL MORTGAGES
A chattel mortgage filed or recorded, created a lien for two
years. The lien could be extended by filing annual statements
within 30 days after each anniversary of the filing or recording
of such mortgage.
This new act merely enlarges this 30-day period to 90 days.
H.B. 257-DETERMINATION OF DESCENT OF PROPERTY
Many lawyers felt that the statutes concerning determination
of descent of real estate should be broadened to include personal
property. In case of a farm, the heirs of a deceased person could
be determined without probate proceedings, but if there was ditch
stock in connection with the farm, there was no similar procedure
to determine who were the owners of the ditch stock.
The new law broadens the old law so that the descent of real
and personal property of a deceased person may be determined,
and if desired in the same proceeding. There is a change in the
title, and in place of the word "land" the word "property" is now
used. There are minor changes in the form of notice and in the
giving of the notice.
APPRECIATION
The writer wants to thank each and every member of his com-
mittee for the weeks of work required to draft the various bills
submitted to the Legislature, for the hours consumed in checking
bills sponsored by others, and for the magnificent job the Legisla-
tive Committee has done.
The Bar Association owes a deep debt of gratitude to many
members of the Legislature. It would not be fair to single out and
name some of them and omit others.
However, we cannot close this article without expressing our
appreciation to Senator Don Brotzman, the Chairman of the Ju-
diciary Committee of the Senate, and to Paul Hodges, the Chair-
man of the Judiciary Committee of the House. While each of these
men carried a terriffic load as the Chairmen of these committees,
nevertheless, they were never too busy to listen to us. They gave
us courteous attention and brought our bills to the attention of the
Committee so that they did reach the floor of each House.
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